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A Neglected Argument in “The Will to Believe” 
Alexander M. Lawson, Hamilton College 
Abstract 
In “The Will to Believe,” William James develops two distinct arguments for the legitimacy of holding a 
belief on what he calls unintellectual grounds. The first of these arguments (which I call the 
‘indeterminacy argument’) attempts to distinguish between intellectual and unintellectual grounds as 
objective epistemological categories. The second argument (which I call the ‘subjective argument’) 
abandons that attempt and instead distinguishes between public and private, and subjectively 
intellectual and unintellectual reasons. Although these arguments differ, and both are present in “The 
Will to Believe,” the indeterminacy argument has received far more critical attention than the subjective 
argument. This disparity is unfortunate because the subjective argument presents a greater challenge to 
James’s opponents than does the indeterminacy argument. In this paper I will draw from “The Will to 
Believe” and other related works by James to outline both arguments. I will also criticize both to show 
why the subjective argument is more successful than the indeterminacy argument at proving James’s 
thesis. 
A Neglected Argument in “The Will to Believe” 
William James’s famous essay, “The Will to Believe,” is commonly understood to argue that 
there are certain questions—such as the question of God’s existence—that we must answer but which 
cannot be answered on purely intellectual grounds. Our answers to these momentous questions, then, 
may legitimately rest on unintellectual grounds. “The Will to Believe” certainly does contain this 
argument, but it is neither the only nor the best argument in that essay. Towards the essay’s end James 
develops a second argument that makes a far better case for adopting beliefs on unintellectual grounds. 
In the interest of intellectual integrity, and to give James his due, all criticism of this controversial essay 
should account for both arguments. 
James spends the majority of his essay defending the first argument (which I call the 
‘indeterminacy argument’) because of his particular intellectual opponent, William Kingdon Clifford. 
Alexander M. Lawson A Neglected Argument in “The Will to Believe” 
6 
Clifford held that beliefs maintained on unintellectual grounds were morally reprehensible because they 
were a kind of selfishness. An unattached person may believe whatever she likes, but when she lives in a 
community her beliefs are accountable to others because they affect those others. Maintaining beliefs 
without evidence is selfish because it means influencing others without good reasons. 
The indeterminacy argument deftly responds to this charge. If empirical evidence or basic logic 
answer a question, then we should rely on that answer. However, some questions do not have such a 
reasonable answer. In these cases, James points out, the only criteria for picking one answer over 
another is something like an a priori light of reason. These criteria are too subjective to yield universal 
truths so philosophers who rely on them always come up with conflicting answers: 
For what a contradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and absolute 
certitude been claimed! The world is rational through and through,—its existence is an 
ultimate brute fact; there is a personal God, —a personal God is inconceivable; there is 
an extra-mental physical world immediately known, —the mind can only know its own 
ideas; a moral imperative exists, —obligation is only the resultant of desires; a 
permanent spiritual principle is in every one, —there are only shifting states of mind; -
there is an endless chain of causes, —there is an absolute first cause; —an eternal 
necessity, —a freedom; —a purpose, —no purpose; -a primal One, —a primal Many; a 
universal continuity, —an essential discontinuity in things, an infinity, —no infinity. 
(1897, 16) 
James claims, then, that empirical evidence and basic logic are much better tests of a belief’s universal 
validity because they do not yield such contradictory answers. These are the grounds that he calls 
“intellectual” and Clifford would agree. 
Thus, when multiple rival theories consistently explain all of the empirical evidence, there is no 
objective test to decide between those theories. Intuitive subjective criteria have popped up—like 
simplicity or the desire for the existence of the divine—but they hold no more sway over disagreeing 
parties than do the contradictory arguments based on competing a priori truths. In these cases the 
evidence is indeterminate, and the difference between the two alternatives is meaningless, according to 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. 
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With no intellectually worthy reason for picking one rival theory over the other, Clifford might 
think that we should remain agnostic in such cases to avoid selfish beliefs. James agrees that we should 
withhold judgment in cases that may provide decisive evidence in the future, but he disagrees with 
Clifford over the cases in which no such decisive evidence will come. He can disagree because Clifford’s 
argument only holds if our unintellectual belief can influence other people in our community, and that is 
not the case here. When two rival theories explain all of the evidence and make all the same material 
predictions, then adopting one or the other will not affect our publicly influential behavior, so that belief 
ceases to be selfish in Clifford’s sense. Because of this, James holds that we may adopt beliefs for 
unintellectual reasons, like simplicity or the desire for the existence of the divine. James extends Peirce’s 
maxim by pointing out that a choice between meaninglessly different options is no choice that should 
affect anyone but the chooser. 
 The indeterminacy argument led Richard Rorty to interpret “The Will to Believe” as an 
argument for privatizing religion. Rorty followed the argument to its logical conclusion: that religion 
justified in this manner cannot influence public action—such as conscientious objection, or voting to ban 
gay marriage—because any religion which would influence an adherent’s public action can be held 
accountable to the rest of the public. Religious belief maintained on unintellectual grounds which 
influences public action is exactly the kind of thing that Clifford deemed selfish. 
James agreed with this extension of his argument. His own formulation of “the religious 
hypothesis” at the end of “The Will to Believe” is particularly anemic, and he claims that its chief benefit 
is to allow believers to take moral holidays. In Pragmatism, he writes of a religion which says little more 
than that humanity can move the world towards salvation, but that salvation is not guaranteed. This 
characterization of religion impels its adherents to act morally, but gives no clue as to what moral action 
is. In order to find out how to act, adherents must consult secular—and therefore publicly debatable—
moral theories. 
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Many religious people could do without the victory won by the indeterminacy argument. A God 
who is only materially effective by acting through us is conceivable enough for most religious people, 
but when we strip that God of any moralizing power and give it all to Kant, Mill, and Rawls, it is hard to 
see why we need God at all. James seems to need God to feel a sense of purpose and that is fine, but 
such a God reminds us of those who call themselves “spiritual but not religious,” and such a belief does 
not do much for organized religious communities with books full of morals and miracles. 
Aside from that massive shortcoming, the indeterminacy argument also suffers a serious logical 
malady. James takes pains to establish that we hold all of our beliefs for unintellectual reasons, and that 
Clifford has merely targeted those beliefs in which the unintellectual reasons played a decisive role after 
we had considered the intellectual reasons. James sees no difference in the unintellectual choice to 
disbelieve something without disconfirming evidence and the unintellectual choice to believe something 
without confirming evidence. The only difference is that Clifford made his unintellectual choice before 
he began collecting evidence and James appears to have made his afterwards. 
The original mistake, however, was to distinguish between intellectual and unintellectual 
reasons in the first place. If, as James argues, Clifford decided that some reasons are intellectual for 
unintellectual reasons, then the indeterminacy argument falls apart because all reasons are 
unintellectual. Simplicity is just as intellectual a reason for believing something as is empirical evidence. 
The indeterminacy argument forgets this and claims that no non-empirical reasons count as good 
reasons (a mistake that the Logical Positivists would make in the coming decades). 
We can see this problem clearly in James’s own troubles with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Peirce 
seemed to think that by keeping all disputes rooted in observable practical effects, we could avoid 
overly metaphysical debate. James, though, understood that practicality covered more than the 
objective world, and that observable effects need not submit to a single interpretation. In his evaluation 
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of the Hegelian Absolute, James calls it a useless concept because it has no practical effects, except that 
it provides comfort to its adherents. That comfort, however, is a practical difference for the Hegelians 
and therefore meaningfully differentiates an idealistic world from a materialistic one. The maxim that 
Peirce intended to distinguish between real differences and meaningless differences eventually makes 
all differences that anyone cares about real, and thus fails to move us past any actual metaphysical 
debate. 
Peirce’s maxim may be better interpreted as a method to resolve disputes, rather than as a 
criterion of the rightness of any belief. By referring all disagreement to concrete particulars, he made all 
disagreement either resolvable or unreal. Concrete particulars are important because they are 
accessible by anyone and so serve as public evidence in an argument—everyone we know of accepts 
them. This, however, does not make an argument that refers to concrete particulars any more 
intellectual for one party or the other than an argument that does not. We may base some beliefs on 
mental concepts which cannot be demonstrated publicly but which we think everyone should accept. 
Likewise, we may disagree about what is actually concrete and particular. Blind people, for instance, do 
not have access to the sorts of empirical reasons to which I would appeal to differentiate between an 
American flag and a Russian flag. Different parties may also interpret the same physical event 
differently, drawing contradictory conclusions from it. 
It seems that all reasons are unintellectual in the sense that we accept any reason as valid 
simply because we do—there is no grand epistemological criterion by which to distinguish intellectual 
reasons from unintellectual ones. James and Clifford both agreed that empirical evidence provided 
intellectual reasons, but they should not have thought that this agreement could illuminate what it was 
about empirical data that is intellectual. Failing to find such a criterion by which to judge a reason 
intellectual or unintellectual, the indeterminacy argument fails because there is no way to distinguish 
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between beliefs held for unintellectual reasons which contradict intellectual reasons and beliefs held for 
unintellectual reasons but harmonize with intellectual reasons. 
The second argument (which I call the ‘subjective argument’) avoids these particular pitfalls. In 
the subjective argument, James claims that beliefs might create their own empirical evidence. This 
means that a belief adopted for unintellectual reasons could create intellectual reasons for maintaining 
that belief. James gives examples of this kind of belief in “The Will to Believe,” but the best example 
comes in another essay, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” which he published in the collection The Will to 
Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy alongside “The Will to Believe.” In this example James 
hikes through the Alps and comes upon a crevasse over which he must leap. 
Being without similar experience, I have no evidence of my ability to perform it 
successfully; but hope and confidence in myself make me sure I shall not miss my aim, 
and nerve my feet to execute what without those subjective emotions would perhaps 
have been impossible. But suppose that, on the contrary, the emotions of fear and 
mistrust preponderate… why, then I shall hesitate so long that at last, exhausted and 
trembling, and launching myself in a moment of despair, I miss my foothold and roll into 
the abyss. (1897, 96-7) 
James’s confidence before he takes the leap is based on some empirical evidence—he knows that he 
can jump, after all—but that evidence is far from decisive. The decisive piece of evidence is the leap 
itself. He may remain agnostic about his success until that simple bit of empirical testing is done, but 
adopting the belief that he will succeed before he performs the decisive test actually influences the 
results of that test as will refraining from adopting any belief. If James believes in his success, then the 
decisive empirical test of that belief may yield different results than it would have had he not believed in 
his success. The empirical evidence might prove the belief true because James had already adopted it. 
This argument differs from the indeterminacy argument in two ways. First, the evidence is 
entirely determinate, or at least determinable. Will James make the leap? Have him attempt it and we 
can find out. Such a question does not fall under the purview of the indeterminacy argument because 
we can test it empirically. Second, it does not attempt to give a definition of what someone should 
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accept as an intellectual reason. It only points out that we can influence a particular class of reasons—
those furnished by empirical evidence, which both James and Clifford accept—by maintaining beliefs 
that have little empirical foundation.  Stated differently, a belief held for non-public, non-intellectual 
reasons can create both public and intellectual evidence for itself. 
One of James’s examples of this kind of belief from “The Will to Believe” is of a man who tries to 
figure out if a stranger likes him or not before introducing himself to that person. In such a situation, the 
introduction itself will play a part in the stranger’s opinion of the man, and a confident introduction will 
likely play out better than a timid one. Thus, the man’s belief that the stranger does or will like him can 
make that fact come about. 
James extends this exact reasoning to religious belief. If we try to determine whether or not God 
exists on intellectual grounds before we become theists, then we might never meet God. On the other 
hand, an unproven belief in God can actually make it easier to commune with God, and such 
communion is the best evidence of theism that there is. 
The subjective argument does not saddle theists with an ineffective God whose only message is 
“don’t worry, you can make things better.” By providing a path to contact with God, the subjective 
argument shows how religious people can weave complex theological doctrines that make specific 
demands upon their adherents. The Jews obey Kosher law because God told Moses to, and Christians 
eat whatever because God told Peter to forget Kosher law. The subjective argument legitimizes specific 
moral codes because God dictated those codes to people. 
The subjective argument has its own problems, however. Although it is a program for further 
empirical testing, it does not promise that everyone will get the same results. If all it took to commune 
with God were the right attitude, then we could all adopt that attitude and record what happens. 
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Obviously, were everyone to try this, we would not all get consistent results. In this case, the belief may 
have created its own intellectual evidence while failing to produce public evidence. 
In order to explain this disagreement, James distinguishes between live and dead hypotheses: 
A live hypothesis is one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is 
proposed. If I ask you to believe in the Mahdi, the notion makes no electric connection 
with your nature,—it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it 
is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi’s 
followers), the hypothesis is among the mind’s possibilities: it is alive. This shows that 
deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the 
individual thinker. (1897, 2-3) 
The correct attitude will only yield positive empirical evidence for religious belief if that belief is a live 
hypothesis for the person adopting the attitude. That people may adopt the correct attitude but reach 
no consensus about the resulting evidence shows that the belief in question is a live hypothesis for some 
and dead for others. For James, the particularity of the individual thinker will determine the nature of 
the hypothesis. 
Although James gives no indication of how the individual thinker’s particularity would affect the 
liveness or deadness of a hypothesis in “The Will to Believe,” he addresses the problem more squarely in 
the Principles of Psychology. There, it seems to be a matter of attention: “The practical and theoretical 
life of whole species, as well as of individual beings, results from the selection which the habitual 
direction of their attention involves…each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what 
sort of universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit” (1890, 424). Again: “A man’s empirical thought 
depends on the things he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent determined by his 
habits of attention. A thing may be present to him a thousand times, but if he persistently fails to notice 
it, it cannot be said to enter his experience… On the other hand, a thing met only once in a lifetime may 
leave an indelible experience on the memory” (1890, 286). These passages suggest that empirical 
experience of God may exist as stimuli for everyone, but only enter conscious experience for some 
because of individual variations in habits of attention. 
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Unlike the vague differences between live and dead hypotheses, differences in attention have a 
solid explanation: prior training. 
Any one of us can notice a phenomenon after it has once been pointed out, which not 
one in ten thousand could ever have discovered for himself. Even in poetry and the arts, 
some one has to come and tell us what aspects we may single out, and what effects we 
may admire, before our aesthetic nature can ‘dilate’ to its full extent and never ‘with the 
wrong emotion’… In short, the only things which we commonly see are those which we 
preperceive, and the only things which we preperceive are those which have been 
labeled for us, and the labels stamped into our mind. (1890, 443-4) 
This stamping process may be very simple, as in learning to attend to the shape of a tree’s leaves to 
identify it. It may also be very complex, as in learning to attend to the musical overtones produced by a 
well-tuned chord. The habits of attention produced in this latter case require some advanced training 
and personal skill. 
For James’s account of the division between live and dead hypotheses to make sense of 
interpersonal differences in religious experience, that experience must be the result of some 
combination of training and skill. The tendency of groups to maintain their religious traditions across 
generations supports this explanation. Parents teach their children to attend to those parts of 
experience pertinent to the beliefs of a particular religion, and thus the children’s experience, trained in 
this way, confirms the religion itself. This also explains the tendency of disbelief to reproduce itself. 
Communication with disbelievers draws our attention to some bit of experience that informs their 
disbelief and may reproduce it in us. 
For James, habits are only plastic in the first thirty years of life, and habits of attention are no 
exception. Once an individual has settled into the habit of attending to some things rather than others, 
he can only change that habit through “as strong and decided an initiative as possible” or because of an 
“indelible experience” (1890, 123, 286). Such effort rarely comes when the habits of attention entail no 
negative consequences, so adult conversion experiences are often the result of some indelible 
Alexander M. Lawson A Neglected Argument in “The Will to Believe” 
14 
experience. The intransigence of habits in adults makes some hypotheses “dead” rather than merely 
unchosen. 
When coupled with the distinction between live and dead hypotheses, the subjective argument 
leads to relativism. This yields the possibility of private empirical evidence which may influence our 
beliefs but which cannot be publicly demonstrated. For many, this will disqualify the argument because 
relativism is such an unwanted result in philosophy. Still, it is an interesting argument for relativism and 
one that is not commonly addressed. Those who wish to refute relativism should account for it in their 
arguments. 
We should also remember that the subjective argument has no logical connection to the 
distinction between live and dead hypotheses. Although that distinction is necessary in James’s defense 
of his own theism, it is not necessary for the example of the leap in the Alps. The difference between the 
two cases is the difference between public and private evidence. In the case of theism, the resulting 
empirical evidence is only accessible to the individual who has the proper training and chooses to 
believe in God. That individual cannot demonstrate the reasons for his belief to other people if they do 
not share his habits of attention. In the case of the leap the evidence is public, so anyone could watch 
James make the jump and then know that his belief in his ability is warranted. Thus the subjective 
argument does not lead to relativism when the choice to adopt a belief justifies itself by bringing about 
public evidence for that belief. 
“The Will to Believe” contains two similar yet distinct arguments for James’s right to maintain 
religious beliefs. The indeterminacy argument takes up most of the essay and has been widely 
discussed. The subjective argument only appears late in the essay, and it has received far less attention. 
This is regrettable because the subjective argument is more successful than the indeterminacy argument 
at showing that we may adopt beliefs on insufficient evidence. However, when James extends the 
subjective argument to cover cases like theism, he must introduce the distinction between live and dead 
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hypotheses. This distinction creates the possibility of non-public empirical evidence. It allows him to do 
far more work with the subjective argument, but that work is far more open to criticism. 
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